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NOTES
involved, the statutory classification will nearly always be upheld. To con-
tinue to follow a rigidified approach to equal protection claims would put
the Court in a position either to begin recognizing more fundamental rights
or suspect classes, or to uphold laws that are invidiously discriminatory but
that do not meet the requirements necessary to warrant strict judicial scrutiny.
All rights not fundamental and all classes not suspect are not the same;
the Court should act on equal protection claims only after a "reasonably prob-
ing look at the legislative goals and means, and at the significance of the
personal rights and interests invaded."'0 1 The Court has not created an
unreasonable test for equal protection claims. The approach used in these
cases is just, and there are still specific requirements that must be met before
the Court will require the state to show a substantial interest in support of
its statute.
This balancing test or intermediate scrutiny allows the Court some leeway
in determining claims arising under the equal protection clause. Although the
outcome of such cases will not be as predictable as cases decided under the
strict two-tier structure of judicial review, the decisions rendered will be based
on a more thoughtful approach based on the circumstances involved in each
case. By considering the circumstances of each case as they relate to the balanc-
ing test for intermediate scrutiny, the Court will be able to protect those prized
rights of our society not deemed fundamental and protect those disadvantaged
and powerless classes not deemed suspect without being required to establish
those rights as fundamental or those classes as suspect. This approach will
allow the Court to protect from invidious discrimination those rights or classes
without raising the level of scrutiny to the level of strict scrutiny, and thereby
assuring nearly every state statute will be struck down, even where there may
be a substantial interest to be protected by the statute in question.
Deirdre Dexter
Copyright: Commercial Use of Sound Recordings
Amendment*
Although copyright protection was deemed to be important enough to be
included in the Constitution of the United States,' the entire area of copyright
has been extended far beyond the original grants of protection, which covered
"authors of any maps, chart, book or books already printed." 2 The expan-
sions made by Congress in the area of copyright have included etchings and
101. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1976).
* This paper has been entered in the 1983 Nathan Burkan Copyright Law Writing Compe-
tition.-Ed.
1. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
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engravings,3 musical compositions,4 dramatic compositions,5 and photographs.6
The purview of copyright has at no time extended, however, to performance
rights for recording artists. This practice of excluding performance rights for
recording artists could be remedied by a bill currently pending before the House
of Representatives.
7
Cited as the "Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment,"' H.R.
1805 would broaden copyright to include performance rights for recording
artists. A similar bill was proposed in an earlier Congress under the title
"Sound Recording Performance Rights Amendment' 9 but was not passed.
The Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment and the Sound
Recording Performance Rights Amendment both concern the same goal-to
enable recording artists to be compensated for public performance of their
recorded work. In fact, the only difference between the two bills is in the
amounts specified for royalties.'0 The Sound Recordings Performance Rights
Amendment would establish a blanket royalty of $25 per calendar year, whereas
the Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment proposes that royalty
rates be established by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal within one year from
the date the Act takes effect." The Copyright Royalty Tribunal has more
control under the second bill and may better respond to market variations,
while the first bill would have required a congressional amendment to alter
the royalty rates.
Brief History of Copyright
Congress is empowered by the United States Constitution "[tlo promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.' 2 The phrase "writings and discoveries" has been expanded in
definition to include areas not previously considered. Expansion is a necessity
in light of the evolution of technology. The drafters of the Constitution, of
course, had no premonition of technological advances such as computer pro-
grams, the electronic media, and video games. Yet these may be original works
that should be protected. In order to fall within copyright protection, an item
must qualify as a "writing."
Throughout the history of United States copyright, the definition of a
3. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
4. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
5. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169,. 11 Stat. 138.
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
7. H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
8. Id.
9. H.R. 997, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
10. H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(E) (1981); H.R. 997, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(E)
(1979).
11. H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(E) (1981); H.R. 997, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(E)
(1979).




"writing" has been expanded many times. In 1909, Congress expanded the
scope of copyrightable material by passing the Copyright Act." This Act in-
cluded coverage for such items as drawings or plastic works of a scientific
or technical nature, motion pictures, and sound recordings, among others."
Many technological advances occurred between 1909 and 1976, and Congress
responded with the Copyright Act of 1976."1 The Copyright Act of 1976 ex-
panded the definition of "writings" to include even pantomime and choreog-
raphy.'
6
The new Act has many significant changes. For example, copyright protec-
tion now begins with the creation of the work,'7 rather than at the time of
registration of the copyright. Thus, a writer is now protected by copyright
from the moment that writer records his ideas in a tangible medium, such
as on paper. If the Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment is
passed, then, according to the new Act, performers' copyright protection will
run from the moment the sounds are recorded.
The constitutionality of copyright is solidly supported by case law. In Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard Posters, " the Court of Appeals of the
Fifth Circuit ruled against a defendant who relied upon a defense of parody
and first amendment rights. In that case, the court stated: "The judgment
of the constitution is that free expression is enriched by protecting the crea-
tions of authors from exploitation by others, and the Copyright Act is the
congressional implementation of that judgment. . . . The first amendment
is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual prop-
erty.'"9 This case suggests that courts will liberally construe the terms "authors
and inventors" because the protected item here was a poster.20 A musical
performance would seem to be as much an intellectual property as a poster.
One of the purposes of copyright is to grant to authors and inventors a
monopoly over their work product for a limited time.2' The idea of the limited
monopoly gives rise to the theory of paying royalties. The court in Chess
Music, Inc. v. Spite22 referred to royalties by stating: "Those who profit from
copyrighted music are obliged to pay not only the piper but the author."' 3
The Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment would require those
who profit from copyrighted music to pay the performer as well. 4
Although authors and inventors holding copyrights are granted a monopoly,
13. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1909) (superseded 1976).
15. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (effective
Jan. 1, 1978) (revising 1909 Copyright Act).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (1976).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
18. 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979).
19. Id. at 1187.
20. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
22. 442 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Minn. 1977).
23. Id. at 1185.
24. H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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this monopoly is not absolute during its term. Devices such as compulsory
licenses" serve to limit the breadth of the monopoly. In essence, a compulsory
license compels the owner of the copyright to license others to use his
copyrighted material in certain circumstances. For example, once the copyright
owner of a musical work allows one person to record that work, the owner
is compelled to allow anyone, anywhere in the world, who so desires also
to record that work under a compulsory license.26 In addition, anyone wishing
to broadcast a copyrighted musical work is free to do so upon filing a notice
and making royalty payments for the composer to the Register of Copyrights.
Failure to pay the royalty fees subjects the broadcaster' to penalties for
infringement.27
Another purpose of copyright is to protect the originality of an author's
work, although the requirement of originality needed to obtain a copyright
is minimal.28 It can be argued that this requirement forbids payment to those
persons who merely perform music or lyrics written by other persons. On
the other hand, it can be argued that most recording artists (singers and/or
instrumentalists) add at least a modicum of originality in their individual ren-
dition of the material. Therefore, it appears that even a minimal contribution
of originality via a performer's own rendition of certain material should enable
that performer to be paid royalties.
Purpose Behind H.R. 1805
The definition of "perform" is set forth in the Copyright Act of 197629
in this manner:
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act
it, either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the
case of a motion picture or other audio-visual work, to show its
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.
30
This definition is not abandoned in any manner by the proposed Commer-
cial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment. The amendment would add to
the last sentence, "in the case of a sound recording, to 'perform' the work
means to make audible the sounds of which it consists."' 3' This change, then,
clearly delineates the sphere of potential infringements. Because broadcasters,
under this definition of recorded music, would be "performing" the music
25. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1976).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1970); Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Original Appalachian Artworks
v. Toy Loft, 489 F. Supp. 174 (D.N.D. 1980); R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., 444
F. Supp. 1080 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
30. Id.




and thus be required to pay royalties, they have lobbied successfully to keep
any type of performance rights amendment from being passed. Broadcasters
helped prevent the Sound Recording Performance Rights Amendment from
becoming law and are continuing to fight against the Commercial Use of Sound
Recordings Amendment.
32
Originally, there was a provision for performance rights in sound record-
ings in the bill that became the 1976 Copyright Act.3 The Register of
Copyrights recommended, however, that the provision be deleted before the
bill was passed.3' One of the main reasons for this opposition was that there
had not been an extensive analysis made of the significance that such a provi-
sion would have on the law of copyrights.3- Following the enactment of the
1976 Copyright Act, Congressman George E. Danielson of California intro-
duced the Sound Performance Amendment.36 When that did not pass in the
House, he introduced the revised but substantially similar Commercial Use
of Sound Recordings Amendment.3" Apparently the concept of paying record-
ing artists performance royalties is at least as old as the 1976 Copyright Act.
The stiff opposition that the idea has faced may indicate difficulty in seeing
the concept actually become law.
Various factors control the rights of authors of musical and written works
that may be applicable to performers of musical works as well, should the
Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment be passed. The Copyright
Act of 1976 provides for a situation in which an employer of an author or
inventor is deemed to be entitled to the copyright of that employee's work.3
The product is termed a "work made for hire.'""3 This is not a mandatory
32. The opposition lobby includes the National Association of Broadcasters and National
Radio Broadcasters Association, among others. Both associations emphasize the value of free
radio air-play to record companies.
33. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
34. Note, Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: The Proposed Amendment to the
Copyright Law, 5 ART. & L. 63 (1980).
35. Id.
36. H.R. 997, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
37. H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
39. Id. § 101 states:
A "work made for hire" is-
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a col-
lective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a transla-
tion, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test,
as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is
a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author
for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, com-
menting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, after-
words, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrange-
ments, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an
"instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publica-
tion and with the purpose of use in systematic instruction activities.
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arrangement any time an employee is hired to create an original work for
an employer, however, because the parties are free to contract that the situa-
tion shall be otherwise.0 In the past, there have been attempts to change the
"work made for hire" concept to a provision giving the copyright to the
employee subject to a royalty-free right of the employer to use the copyrighted
work, but this change has been rejected.4
Presumably, were the Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment
to become law, those who would benefit the most would be the lesser-known
performers because the well-known performers who are consistently hired by
recording companies have the bargaining power to satisfy themselves with
favorable terms in-their recording agreements. Yet, such a benefit to the lesser-
known performers may be circumvented by the "work made for hire" provi-
sion of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Another consideration that may affect a performance right in sound record-
ings is the definition of a performer in reference to sound recordings.
Presumably, a performer would include anyone who makes'a contribution
to the music being recorded. Because originality is required for copyright pro-
tection, it could be argued that certain performers are incapable of contributing
enough originality to warrant protection. Clearly, a pianist, a vocalist, or a
flautist should be deemed to contribute originality by their performance because
of the ability to control the tone and mood of a composition through their
instruments or. voices. A percussionist may pose a more difficult problem,
however, in terms of categorizing for purposes of copyright because it can
be argued that a percussionist has less control over the output of his instru-
ments. It would, however, make little sense to allow a pianist, a vocalist,
or a flautist to obtain a copyright on a performance, but not allow the same
to a percussionist. A percussionist is also capable of contributing originality
through the different instruments (triangle, bass drum, snare drum, etc.) that
he chooses to use. Judge Learned Hand recognized this issue more than twenty-
five years ago. In Capitol Records v. Mercury Record Corp.,"' a 1955 copyright
case, he noted in dissent:
There may indeed be some instruments-e.g., percussive-which
do not allow any latitude, though I doubt even that; but in the
-vast number of renditions, the performer has a wide choice, depend-
ing upon his gifts, and this makes his rendition pro tanto quite
as original a "composition" as an "arrangement" or "adaptation"
of the score itself, which § (b) [of the 1909 Copyright Act] makes
copyrightable.3
Regardless of the instrument, or voice, used to perform a composition, and
regardless of whether the music performed is in exact accord with the notes
40. Id.
41. House Comm. oN JuDicIARY, CoPYRiGHT LAw REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976).
42. 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).




on a musical staff, there will always be some degree of originality because
performers and vocalists differ as much stylistically as they do genetically.
The view and definition of performers would be changed substantially by
the proposed Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment. Currently,
the Copyright Act provides the copyright owner with the exclusive right to
perform the copyrighted work publicly in the case of literary, musical, dramatic
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audio-
visual works." This list of copyrightable works included within a performance
right specifically excludes any performance right in sound recordings in two
other sections of the 1976 Copyright Act." The Commercial Use of Sound
Recordings Amendment purports to alter this exclusion, and "performer"
is defined in this amendment as follows:
(2) "Performers" are instrumental musicians, singers, conductors
actors, narrators, and others whose performance of a literary,
musical, or dramatic work is embodied in a sound recording, and,
in the case of a sound recording embodying a musical work, the
arrangers, orchestrators, and copyists who prepared or adapted the
musical work for the particular performance of the sounds fixed
in the sound recording.
6
This section of the amendment also states that a person will be deemed
a "performer" regardless of whether he made a contribution under a "work
made for hire." There may be some criticism of this section because of the
lack of clarity in its reference to "work made for hire." By saying that a
contributor to the sound recording is still considered a "performer," there
is no previous or subsequent provision clarifying whether this states an excep-
tion to "work made for hire." Is a "performer," even though in a position
of an employee whose "work" is "made for hire," still to be able to receive
royalty payments on his behalf? The answer is unclear from the text of the
amendment. However, the logic of the "work made for hire" provision in
the Copyright Act of 197647 seems to indicate that a "performer" in a "work
made for hire" situation will not receive royalties.
The amendment formalizes the division of royalties to be paid performers,"
and states that neither a performer nor a copyright owner may transfer his
right to the royalties to the copyright owner or performer, respectively.49 This
provision is commendable because it prevents either performers or copyright
owners with greater bargaining power, achieved by fame or otherwise, from
44. 2 M. NIMER, COPYRIGHT § 8.14 (1982); 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1976).
45. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) & 114(a) (1976).
46. H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., § 7(E)(2) (1981).
47. Pub.'L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (effective
Jan. 1, 1978) (revising 1909 Copyright Act).
48. H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7(C)(14) (1981). Under this section, one-half of the
royalties for distribution would go to the copyright owners, and one-half would go to the per-
formers. The one-half to the performers would be divided among the individual performers on
a sound recording on a per capita basis.
49. H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7(C)(14) (1981).
1983]
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preying.upon lesser-known performers or copyright owners by contract, thus
creating an equal distribution of bargaining power.
The amendment also states that the Copyright Royalty Tribunal shall hire
private entities to distribute royalty funds to the entitled performers."0 In the
United States, at the present time, there are three major organizations that
license the use of copyrighted music, and the copyright statute specifically
recognizes the authority of them to license musical works. 1 The three are
the American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP), Broad-
cast Music, Inc. (BMI), and SESAC, Inc. (formerly the Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers).2" ASCAP and BMI, both nonprofit organiza-
tions that distribute, less costs, all licensing fees to songwriters and music
publishers, license 35% and 65%, respectively, of the year's top 100 songs,
as rated according to music trade publications."
Most likely, organizations such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC would be
the entities to distribute royalties to performers under the Commercial Use
of Sound Recordings Amendment. These organizations ensure punishment
against infringers of copyrighted music by policing establishments that refuse
to pay for a license from ASCAP or BMI.' An establishment owner or
manager is wise to pay the license fee because if the establishment plays
copyrighted music, of which such unauthorized play constitutes an infringe-
ment, suit will be brought in federal court.55 Should the federal court rule
that the establishment is guilty of an infringement, the establishment will have
to pay statutory damages," which may even exceed the original licensing fee.
57
The policing undertaken by these licensing organizations is serious, unrelent-
ing, and capable of inducing the owners of the establishments to pay the licens-
ing fees.5 8 Commercial establishments liable for royalty fees have been broadly
defined to include stores in which radio is played over speakers for the enjoy-
ment of customers.9 An action was brought by ASCAP against The Gap
Stores, Inc. for using music without having paid a licensing fee." The court
50. H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., § 10(C) (1981). Under this section, the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal is to appoint private entities to collect royalties, but such appointment does not relieve
the Tribunal of the responsibility to ensure fair and equitable distribution of royalties, so that
the Tribunal would oversee the work of the private entities.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 116(e)(3) (1976).
52. Id.
53. Goldstein, The Performance of Music Under the New Copyright Law, 43 Tax. B.J. 516
(1980).
54. Id.
55. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1400(a) (1976).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976); 3 M. Nlaxm, Copyiu"HT § 14.04 (1982). There are maximum
and minimum limits on statutory damages, but the decision as to amount is within the judge's
discretion. The minimum statutory damage amount is $250 (although there are exceptions) for
infringement, while the maximum statutory amount is $10,000 (and there are exceptions here also).
57. Widenski v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 147 F.2d 909 (Ist Cir. 1945).
58. Goldstein, supra note 53.
59. Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 2012
(1982).




noted in that case that to be exempt from the licensing fee, the defendant
would have had to satisfy the following three requirements: (1) its apparatus
would have to have been a kind commonly used in private homes; (2) no
direct charge could have been made to listen to the performances; and (3) the
transmissions could not be further transmitted to the public.
6'
Such requirements as these are well-stated and are in accord with the defini-
tion of a performer under the Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amend-
ment. In the above case, there was no contention that the defendants charged
customers to listen to the music, but the case was nevertheless decided against
the defendant.62 Therefore, although commercial use of recorded music is the
most easily ascertainable element of infringement, this element is not essen-
tial in finding that infringement has occurred.
The record piracy trade does not go unpunished for its infringement, either.
In CBS, Inc. v. Waters,6 a federal district court awarded statutory copyright
damages against a record company from which the FBI seized approximately
twelve tons of bootleg records, consisting of several live performances of Bruce
Springsteen, which were recorded without his consent. This case "resulted
in what may be one of the largest awards of statutory copyright damages
ever made."
64
One can easily see that the rights of copyrighted music (copyright presently
belonging only to composers of the melody and/or lyrics) are zealously guarded
by ASCAP and BMI, as well as by SESAC, although SESAC has a more
limited sphere of influence than either ASCAP or BMI. In the event the Com-
mercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment were to become law, there is
little doubt that the rights of performers also would be guarded with such zeal.
A Comparison to English Law
In various other countries, a performance right in sound recordings has
been recognized. For example, Great Britain provides for royalty payments
to performers of sound recordings.65 The amount of the royalty to be given
the performer is decided on the basis of a grading system.6 After listening
to a sound recording, a board of musicians discuss the originality contained
61. Id. at 85-86.
62. Id.
63. 2 ENTERTAImMENT L. REP. 7 (No. 18 1981), reporting on CBS, Inc. v. Waters, Case
No. CV-79-2559 - MML (C.D. Cal. 1980).
64. Id.
65. McFarlane, A Question of Arrangement, 139 Naw L.J. 33 (1980) (published in England).
See also Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, 1978, Hearings on H522-7, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Performance Rights Hearings]. At this hearing, the statement
was made in. reference to performance rights in sound recordings and in reference to attending
the IFA (the International Federation of Actors along with the International Federation of Musi-
cians): "And it is a source of embarrassment always to us-is it not, Mr. Bikel?-that every
year the issue of the Rome Convention and copyright comes up at this congress, and they are
amazed that this country is still that far behind." (Statement of Kathleen Nolan, Screen Actors
Guild president in 1978), at 57.
66. McFarlane, supra note 65.
1983]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
in the sound recording, and then assign to the recording a fraction that
represents a point value.' Under this grading system, a sound recording that
is so creative as to have become a new composition in form is given the highest
rating (12/12), and thus the performers on that sound recording are entitled
to the largest amount of royalties for sound recording performances." The
degree of originality of the performance dictates the point value that par-
ticular recording is to receive, thereby also dictating the royalty amount to
be received by the performer(s). Even minor alterations to melodic lines are
recognized as a contribution of some degree of originality, and thus are ap-
pointed a 2/12 value.6 9 Some writers indicate that this approach is both prac-
tical and logical.70
The solution in existence in Great Britain, however, would be fraught with
problems in the United States. The foremost problem would be one of discre-
tion initially: i.e., who would draw the line in terms of originality of a sound
recording? Even among experienced musicians and composers, there are dif-
ferences of opinion about music, and these differences are as variable as human
nature. There would be disharmony, at least some of the time. Furthermore,
having a board of experienced musicians and performers decide whether cer-
tain other performers of recorded music are entitled to royalties, with such
decisions being based on the opinions of this board, may raise a constitu-
tional due process issue.
At any rate, -it is significant that the United Kingdom is among the countries
that have faced the problem of performance rights in sound recordings and
decided to issue royalties on that basis. The British system does contain a
solution to recognizing performances as a valid contribution in sound record-
ings and should not be overlooked in attempts to design an American solution.
The Proposed Amendment
As mentioned previously, the broadcasters' lobby strongly opposes the
passage of any bill allowing performance rights in sound recordings.7 The
broadcasters base their objections to any proposed amendment of this nature
on the value of free radio air-play to record companies.
72
Under the current broadcasting system, new releases are sent to radio stations




70. Id. McFarlane contends that the Copyright Act of the United Kingdom deals in abstrac-
tions when it talks of original works, but that the English system is a logical and practical way
of solving the gray area of granting performance rights.
71. Performance Rights Hearings, supra note 65. The opposition includes Durham Live Broad-
casting Service (representing North Carolina Association of Broadcasters), Southern California
Broadcasters Association, National Association of Broadcasters, Amusement and Music Operators
Association, National Radio Broadcasters Association, Combined Communications Association
and California Music Merchants Association.




free new releases, of course, do so in the hope that the publicity will spur
popularity and thus boost record sales.7"
Broadcasters claim that the benefit of publicity to the new releases is of
greater value to record companies than the need to compensate performers.
No one can dispute that without radio providing widespread dissemination
of recorded material, the popularity of any given recorded performance could
not possibly be as great because any other audience would be limited.
The antithesis of the broadcasters' argument is that radio stations are cur-
rently receiving the benefit of free programming via the new releases. This
constitutes a rather obvious reason for the broadcasters' opposition to a sound
performance amendment to the copyright law."
On the other hand, there are strong supporters of an amendment to the
1976 Copyright Act to include a performance right in sound recordings.76 These
supporters are able to pierce the broadcasters' argument that the record com-
panies benefit by the free releases by looking at the goal of broadcasting.
7"
Because the goal of broadcasters is to increase their number of listeners (and
thereby increase their advertising business and hence their profits), the radio
stations are the true beneficiaries under the current broadcasting/record-
releasing system. The newly released records unjustly enrich the broadcasting
stations because they are able to use the records to increase their profits without
having to pay any compensation.
Furthermore, the goal of broadcasting stations is in no way related to pro-
moting unknown performers. Often, a radio listener does not know who he
is listening to because the name of the performer has not been mentioned
by the broadcaster, and other vocalists, such as back-up singers, and instru-
mentalists are rarely publicized on the air. When sound recordings are used
to provide background music, the individual artists are never promoted,
although their work is being exploited."
Congressman Danielson, in referring to the need for a performance rights
amendment, stated: "I've never believed that people should contribute their
74. Id.
75. By way of analogy, 17 U.S.C. § 110(7) (1976) exempts from royalties the playing of
recorded music in record stores when the purpose of that play is to induce people to buy the
records. The transmission of the recorded music, however, cannot go beyond the establishment,
and this is a significant difference from broadcasting. The record store exemption is allowed
because the purpose behind the exemption is to induce customers to enter the store and then
buy the record. Listening to a recording on the radio does not have the same effect because
a listener is not a customer of anything in particular.
76. Performance Rights Hearings, supra note 65. Supporters include the American Federa-
tion of Musicians, the American Federation of TV and Radio Artists, the Los Angeles Philhar-
monic Orchestra, the American Council for the Arts (ACA), Screen Actors Guild, National Citizens
Communication Lobby, the Recording Industry Association, the president of the entertainment
group of 20th Century Fox Film Corp., Crescendo Records, A and M Records, International
Federation of Producers of Phonograms and Videograms, and Elektra Asylum Records.
77. Id. (testimony by Jack Golodner, AFL-CIO Department for Professional Employees).
78. Id. at 5. "We cannot keep taking and expect to keep taking from our creative people
without returning in some measure the profits reaped from the taking" (specific statement by
Golodner).
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property or their services to another without fair compensation. It just simply
amounts to unjust enrichment which is contrary to our theory of law.""
Performers are indeed contributing their intellectual property (their own
originality in contributing to the sound recording) and their services. After
all, there would be virtually no product without the performers. Very few
composers have the capabilities of playing every instrument necessary to make
a sound recording that is totally a product of their own performance. Those
performers who do contribute to the making of a sound recording should
be considered worthy of receiving royalties.0
Conclusion
Thus far, copyright law has expanded slowly to accommodate changing
technology. The rights of recording artists for their performances is rather
obviously missing from this expansion. The opposition to any such amend-
ment by broadcasting associations and the support of it by artists and artistic
organizations has been consistent since the proposed revision in the 1976
Copyright Act. Briefly, broadcasters oppose a performance right because of
the economic effect it would have on their businesses, and artists support
it because they believe there is creativity involved in a musical performance.
Copyright is a constitutional right to grant a monopoly to "writings," and
the past has shown that copyright has been revised slowly to expand the mean-
ing of a "writing." There is no solid argument against expanding the mean-
ing of "writing" to include a performance right in sound recordings.
Furthermore, a performance right has been recognized by various other coun-
tries and by the Rome Convention.8 The United States lags far behind in
this area, and this is contrary in general to this country's usual concern for
the protection of property. Intellectual property should merit as much pro-
tection as does real or various other categories of personal property.
Musicians are in a position whereby others are allowed to profit by the
musicians' works without making just compensation.8 2 Moreover, it is ironic
that recording companies, through their sound engineers, are able to obtain
copyright on the end product of the performers' labors,8 3 yet the performers
79. Id. at 9-10 (statement by Congressman George E. Danielson).
80. Id. at 6. Golodner stated that his father, a musician, was a violinist with the NBC Sym-
phony for 12 years under the directorship of Toscanini:
But then he was displaced by NBC because NBC didn't need him anymore. They
still used his work.... In his later years he listened to himself on the radio making
money for others while he was unemployed. He had only social security checks
when he died, but he made millions for others.... It's little wonder that he didn't
and could not encourage his children to pursue music as a career.
81. Id. at 57. (by statement of Katheen Nolan, Screen Actors Guild, 1978 president).
82. Id. at 6. (statements by Golodner). See note 80 supra.
83. 1 M. NMMER, CoPYRIGHT § 2.10[All2][b] at 2-147 (1982). This section states: "It is true
that the record producer may acquire the engineer's copyright by virtue of an employment for
hire relationship, or possibly by direct assignment, but not merely by virtue of the fact that
he 'set up' the recording session." This statement is a recognition of how the record company
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